Agentive cosmopsychism
One of the requirements for a cosmic subject to have an intentional effect on social evolution is for the cosmic subject to act as an agent, for it to act purposively. That is, the cosmic subject must exercise an ability to influence the course of the evolution of nature/itself. So, assuming that there is indeed a cosmic subject, what evidence or reasonable inferences are there that could support the view that this subject would act as a purposive agent?
Of key significance here is that it is reasonable to infer by analogy that if the universe is a cosmic subject then it could potentially act with purpose. Given that intentionality and purposiveness are a fundamental attribute of the only consciousness of which we have first hand knowledge - our own - it does not seem, on the face of it, unreasonable to suppose that if a universal consciousness exists it could also be endowed with this attribute.
While the analogy with our own case means that it may be reasonable to suppose that a cosmic subject could be endowed with purposiveness, is there any actual evidence that this is in fact the case? A key element of acting purposively is to act with foresight and anticipation. Even the most simple actions to which we attribute purpose, such as bending down to pick up a pen, involve anticipating what one is going to do. So any evidence of behaviour which appears to be based on directiveness towards a future state, actions which are suggestive of being aimed towards achieving a result in the future, could be an indicator that the behaviour is purposive. Two possible areas for evidence of this are the fine tuning of laws for the conditions of life and the fact that human capacities far exceed what was needed for reproductive fitness in the environment under which the human species evolved.
In relation to fine tuning, in this article Philip Goff speculates that “agentive cosmopsychism” is a parsimonious explanation for the fine tuning of the universe for the possibility of life (a more detailed paper on the same topic is available here). Goff argues that a conscious universe could have “chosen” the initial conditions and the laws of physics in order to make possible a universe of value in which life was possible. He argues that agentive cosmopsychism is an arguably more parsimonious explanation for fine tuning that other explanations such as multiverse theory or theistic explanation which invoke the intervention of a perfect and supernatural deity.
Goff speculates that the fine tuning could have occured in the first 10-43 seconds of the universe, known as the Planck Epoch, where current physical theories and laws of physics do not apply. In this period, the universe allegedly chose what the physical laws and constant would be such that the evolution of life would later be possible.
As an aside, Paul Davies' book on fine tuning (“The Goldilocks Enigma”) argues that under some forms of Grand Unified theory, different laws of physics could obtain in different areas of the universe. He also notes Johnathon Wheeler’s view that their may have been an inbuilt loosensess in the laws of physics which means that they may have emerged in an approximate form and sharpened up over time. I don’t know if Davies' speculations, which were published in 2006, have any validity at the current time but if they do, the implication is that fine tuning need not have occurred exclusively during the Planck Epoch.
If the conditions for the appearance of life were set by the cosmic subject long before life evolved, this is obviously suggestive of foresight and purposive behaviour of the cosmic subject.
In relation of the evolution of advanced human capacities, the issue is how human capacities such as those for advanced mathematics, science and art could have evolved at a time when there would be no selective advantage for these capacities. Certainly there may have been selective advantage in basic numeric capacity or in being able to attract mates with the display of some artistic skill, but it does seem that the capacities with which humans have been endowed, such as that for theoretical physics and advanced calculus, far exceed what would be required under the conditions in which we evolved.
The most convincing argument from a Neo-Darwinian perspective to address this issue is that such abilities are by-products of more basic abilities which were selected for. Nevertheless, it does seem extraordinary what humans are capable of which never appeared or served any purpose until fairly recently in human history. If it is assumed that a cosmic subject exists and fine tuning already provides grounds for supposing that the universe acts purposively, then it seems reasonable that an alternative explanation for the advanced capacities of humans is that the universe has purposively influenced the mutations upon which natural selection acts in order to facilitate the evolution of these capacities.
In this regard, it is worth remembering that the evolution of human capacities from natural selection of traits arising from random mutation is not an empirically proven fact but an assumption. As Bernardo Kastrup has argued the randomness of mutation is assumed to be the case on the basis of the further assumption that there are no purposive actions responsible for mutation. However, if cosmopyschism is the case then there is no basis for an a priori assumption that the universe does not act purposively.
In my view, fine tuning and human capacities indicate that if there are sound reasons for inferring the existence of a universal cosmic subject, then there are also sound reasons for inferring that this subject acts purposively. That is, if there are grounds for accepting cosmopsychism then purposive behaviour on the part of the cosmic subject becomes more plausible than alternative explanations for these things such as multiverses or fortuitous mutation.
Therefore, it seems to me that the primary arena in which debates about purpose in the universe succeed or fail may be the arena of philosophy of mind - to rebut purpose in nature it needs to
be shown that cosmopsychism is not amongst the most viable explanations for human consciousness.
The Decombination problem
With regard to the possible agentive capacities of a cosmic subject, one issue that needs to be considered is what has become known as the “decombination problem”. The decombination problem refers to the problem of how lower level subjects, such as humans selves, are derived or constituted from a universal cosmic subject. The ways in which this issue could be potentially be resolved have implications for whether or not a cosmic subject could or would act as a purposive agent.
Two recent solutions to the decombination problem have been proposed by Itay Shani and Miri Albahari. Both of these authors argue that humans consciousness is grounded in a nondual universal consciousness. Albahari describes this universal consciousness as “beyond the subject/object division, beyond the bounds of space and time, completely self-subsistent.”.
The issue that arises in relation to nondual characterisations of a completely self-subsistent universal cosmic subject and agentive cosmopsychism is that there seems to be no reason for a completely self-subsistent entity to act purposively. Indian philosopher Swami Krishnananda enunciates this point in this critique of Hegel; “If the Absolute is to be the sole reality, its being should be unconditioned and should consist in non-relative, intuitive experience, which also means that it should be without any change or modification in its being, that it should not stand in need of anything from outside, should not involve internal development or evolution.” Thus it would appear that from a nondual cosmopsychist perspective, it is problematic to conceive of the universe exercising any agentive or purposive capacities.
However, another perspective on the decombination problem is provided by Bernardo Kastrup in this paper. Kastrup draws on analogies with Dissociative Identity Disorder (‘DID’) to argue that living organisms are dissociated alters of cosmic consciousness (alters in DID are ‘discrete centers of self-awareness’). The inanimate world that we see around us is posited as the extrinsic appearance of the thoughts of cosmic consciousness and other living organisms we see as the extrinsic appearance of other dissociated alters. Kastrup distinguishes dual-aspect cosmopsychism from idealist cosmopsychism (which equates to idealism), but this distinction is not relevant for the purposes of this post.
If Kastrup’s analogy holds then just as purposively acting human subjects with DID have dissociated alters, it may also be reasonable to infer that a cosmic subject which acts purposively has dissociated alters such as human subjects. That is, the DID analogy with a cosmic subject could lend weight to the view that a cosmic subject may act as a purposive agent.
I have not examined the respective arguments of Kastrup, Shani and Kastrup in great depth but I think at this stage it can be concluded that the decomobination problem and possible resolutions thereof do not seem to be any reason to discount the possibility of a purposive cosmic subject. Fine tuning and the evolution of advanced human capacities would then further support the likelihood of this possibility.
So, to sum up so far, if there are reasonable grounds to hold that cosmopsychism is the case then there are also reasonable grounds to infer that the cosmic subject acts with purpose. The decombination problem does not pose an insuperable problem to imputing such purposiveness.
Motivations of the cosmic subject
On the assumption that it is reasonable to suppose that there is a universal cosmic subject that acts purposively, the next question that comes to mind is what would motivate the cosmic subject, That is, what reasonably grounded speculations can be made about what the aims and purposes of actions of the cosmic subject might be? Fine tuning and the evolution of human capacities suggest that the aims of the universe may include being inhabited by human beings with remarkable capacities, but what more can be said about what might motivate the actions of a cosmic subject?
Some guidance here could be sought from the pre-eminent philosopher of the evolution of universal subjectivity, Hegel. Hegel saw the evolution of universal subjectivity being a process of self-recognition occuring through stages, in which each stage resolves the antagonisms of the former stages whilst also generating further antagonisms. The culmination of this process is spirit or mind's realisation of absolute knowledge.
Hegel’s framework could potentially be adapted to a cosmopsyshist framework by integrating current knowlege in fields such as biology and physics and adapting the field of realisation of universal subjectivity from the realm of pure spirit or reason to the realm of the sensuously experienced world. This would entail that the pinnacle of the realisation of universal spirit would not occur by virtue of being instantiated in the mind of a nineteenth century philosopher, but through the realisation of freedom and self-determination in the structures and organisation of the observable universe. This realisation of universal subjectivity occurring in the observable universe rather than in an abstract realm is consistent with phenomena such as fine tuning and evolution of human capacities.
Two of Hegel’s contemporaries, Arthur Schopenhauer and Ludwig Feuerbach, saw compassion as integral to human morality and development, although their philosophies were very different in other respects. Compassion can be defined as the ability to understand the emotional state of another, with the added element of having a desire to alleviate or reduce their suffering. Schopenhauer reasoned that every living thing possesses will, such that humans and animals are fundamentally the same and can recognize themselves in each other. Feuerbach saw the moral will as having come to identify its own interests with the interests of other such that the will “seeks to cause no harm because it wishes to suffer no harm”. Of course, numerous others through the ages have also seen compassion as integral to human morality and personal growth.
Are there any grounds upon which one could attribute compassion to a universal cosmic subject?Perhaps such grounds could be developed on the basis that compassion is an integral part of any advanced form of consciounsess. Or another argument could perhaps be developed that if the universe has an interest in the development of advanced human capacities, it must itself possess advanced capacities including the capacity for compassion.
If such grounds could be established, then one could possibly adapt Hegel’s schema such that as part of its process of the self-recognition, the universe aims to eliminate the suffering it feels in itself through feeling the suffering of others.
Under such a schema one could envisage that the agency of the universe would be directed towards the elimination of all forms of suffering in human societies, humans being the most advanced form of animal consciousness. From there, elimination of all suffering in other living things may become one of the goals of a society free of suffering, the goals of the cosmic subject aligned with those of a future utopia.
The is all wildly speculative of course, but if there is a cosmic subject which acts purposively, it seems to me to be at least within the realm of plausibility that this is the direction in which the universe may be headed.
How might the cosmic subject act?
If it is assumed for the sake of argument that a cosmic subject does exist and does act purposively to influence the development of human cultural and societal evolution, another pertinent question which comes to mind is how this would occur? Further, what might be the constraints on such influence be? Clearly, if a postulated cosmic subject does act out of compassion to limit the suffering of sentient beings its powers must be highly constrained, given the unfathomable amounts of pain and suffering endured by living creatures over the millenia.
An obvious constraint on a purposively acting cosmic subject are physical laws. In fact, it could be argued that even if a cosmic subject exists, it could not exert any influence at all on societal change, given that the laws of physics are generally accepted as determining how physical entities behave (notwithstanding indeterminacy at the quantum level). However, alternative characterisations of natural law are possible that would allow for the cosmic subject to influence the course of worldly events. For example, under the schema of Alfred North Whitehead, physical laws are descriptive rather prescriptive, being akin to ‘habits’ of nature. Like any habit, such habits can occasionally not be followed. Such occurrences would be the times when ‘downward causation’ from the cosmic subject could exert an influence on the course of physical events. So under this one could say that physical laws constrain how the cosmic subject might act, but do not prevent it from acting. Further discussion on Whitehead’s conception of laws is contained in this previous post.
Another and related likely constraint on the influences of a cosmic subject is its history. Just as the options available to a growing organism are constrained by its evolutionary history and physiological development ( such that for example, an organism that has developed certain muscles or behvavioural capacities has different options available to it at a particular point in time than others), so too the evolutionary history and the pathways chosen by a cosmic subject in the past, constrain its potential for future actions. This evolutionary history of the universe which constrains its influence includes the initial conditions of the universe and the the ingrained habits we interpret as the laws of physics.
Note that the extent to which things such as physical laws and evolutionary history of the universe might constrain its influences in the present is not something which can be determined solely by reasoning, but requires ascertainment through empirical observation and historical research. Whilst indeed anything may be possible in theory, history shows us that in actuality this is not the case. Nevertheless, the potential for occasional breaks in the order of things cannot be discounted.
So how might these occasional breaks in universal regularities manifest in the realm of human and social evolution? One could perhaps looks at what Slavoj Zizek and others have called the “Event”, situations where an “effect seems to exceed its causes”:
“an event at its purest and most minimal [is] something shocking, out of joint that appears to happen all of a sudden and interrupts the usual flow of things; something that emerges seemingly out of nowhere, without discernible causes, an appearance without solid being as its foundation…. [T]here is, by definition, something ‘miraculous’ in an event.”
So how might such "events" occur as a result of influences of a cosmic subject. Some possible examples are:
- The Axial age, from the 8th to the 3rd century BCE was the period when, roughly at the same time around most of the inhabited world, the great intellectual, philosophical, and religious systems that came to shape subsequent human society and culture emerged. For example, the ancient Greek philosophers, Indian metaphysicians and logicians (who articulated the great traditions of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism), Persian Zoroastrianism, the Hebrew Prophets, the “Hundred Schools” (most notably Confucianism and Daoism) of ancient China all emerged during the axial age. Perhaps evental irruptions were influential in developments during this period.
- Periods of revolutionary upheaval such as the French revolution may have been subject to influences by the cosmic subject. The Terror that followed the establishment of the first French republic may also be indicative of the constraints of the cosmic subject -while it may be able to influence the instigation of sociopolitical events, the effects of such instigation may depend on the actions of freely acting human beings.
- Perhaps also, a cosmic subject could have some responsibility for moments of scientific or artistic inspiration, such as Kekule's recollection that he had conceived the ring shape of the benzene molecule after having a reverie or day-dream of a snake seizing its own tail.
- Similarly, breakthrough moments of synchronicity, new art movements and episodes of religious fervour or mass hysteria could all potentially have been subject to cosmic influences.
Of course, in all of these examples, further justification would be needed to justify postulating the evental influence of a cosmic subject over other explanations more aligned with conventional explanations of human behaviour.
Again, this is all wildly speculative and is not intended to be a definitive argument for the influences of cosmic consciousness on social events. Nevertheless, lest entertaining these ideas seems too unhinged, it would pay to retrace the steps which led here. These steps can briefly be summarised as follows:- Consciousness exists
- Cosmopsychism is a reasonable explanation for human consciousness
- Given 2, it is reasonable to assume that purposive actions of a cosmic subject could have influenced the fine tuning of the universe for the evolution of life and the evolution of advanced human capacities.
- Given 3, it is reasonable to conclude that a cosmic subject may have influenced and will continue to influence the social development of humanity.
By way of conclusion, I think it could be said that agentive cosmopsychism provides some grounds for hope in a bright, maybe even spectacular, future for humanity.
A question which arises from this is how does this hope relate to secular and religious visions of hope for the world?
Both secular hope and religious hope often portray a wonderful future for the earthly reality we live in. The difference lies in how this comes about. For example, writing from a Christian perspective, German theologian Jürgen Moltmann posits a time in the future when God's kingdom will dwell on earth. For Moltmann, this will not be the result of historical progress but of God's intervention, an intervention which is "not of this world" (John 18:36). In contradistinction to this, secular hope, where it posits a future utopia, generally does so on the basis of the historical progress of the struggles of humanity. Secular hope is a "this worldly" hope which places its trust in the achievements of humanity, not God.
The cosmopsychist vision of hope sits between these two poles. The source of cosmopsychic hope lies not in a transcendent God intervening from outside the universe, or in the historical progression of societies struggling against the forces of nature, but in the evolution of nature itself. People, being part of nature, are instrumental to and active participants in this evolution.
Hope springs forth from life itself.
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