Tuesday, February 28, 2012

Mind Dust interviews

The Mind Dust website has a series of interview clips with various philosophers on the topic of panpsychism taken at a conference in Munich last year.

Includes questions answered by Galen Strawson, David Chalmers, William Seager, Gregg Rosenberg, David Skrbina and others. Most clips go for roughly 1 to 3 minutes and are well worth a look.

Friday, August 19, 2011

Does Secular Buddhism entail rejection of Rebirth?

In recent times there has been interest in the congruence of some of the core concepts of buddhism and consciousness studies. Concepts such as impermanence and the lack of a permanent, enduring self have been argued to be consistent with modern findings of neurosicence and physics. It has also been suggested that the methods of introspective investigation and insight utilised in buddhist practices could be useful in developing a first-person methodology for studying consciousness. For instance, in her book "Consciousness: An Introduction", author and consciousness researcher Susan Blackmore devotes a chapter to buddhism and meditation as exemplars of "first person" aproaches to consciousness.

However, one sticking point in the development of a harmonious relationship between buddhism and consciousness research is the issue of rebirth. Belief in rebirth is contended to be incompatible with a scientific worldview. For instance, Stephen Batchelor, an ex monk and popular writer who has written "Buddhism without Beliefs" and "Confession of a Buddhist Atheist" (both of which I highly recommend) argues for a rationally based buddhism consistent with modern science. He argues here that rebirth is a "relic of ancient Indian culture that has attached itself to Buddhism throughout its history, and that is perhaps no longer necessary."

Similarly, Blackmore, who has practised Zen meditation for 25 years and is also known as a prominent skeptic of the paranormal writes that "If human consciousness can really leave the body and operate without a brain then everything we know in neuroscience has to be questioned".

In my view, the views of Blackmore and Batchelor could be argued against on at least two fronts.

Firstly, their position seems more akin to a buddhism based on physicalist beliefs rather than a buddhism without beliefs. Batchelor writes in Connfession of a Buddhist Atheist (p36) that " Given current scientific knowledge of the brain, I did not find it difficult to believe that such an organ was capable of producing thoughts, feelings and perceptions". This seems to reflect a naive faith in physicalism and ignorance about the philosophy of consciousness.

Susan Blackmore, a close follower of Daniel Dennett, is more philosophically grounded in her reflections but, to me at least, evokes a world view in which, to quote Whitehead, " nature is a dull affair, soundless, scentless, colourless; merely the hurrying of material, endlessly, meaninglessly."

Contra Batchelor and Blackmore, I think there is enough philosophical and scientific uncertainty in relation to consciousness to conclude that a secular, skeptical buddhism does not necessarily mean a buddhism based on physicalism.

Secondly, I believe that it is incorrect to assert that a belief in rebirth is necessarily incompatible with a rational and scientific world view. Here are some reasons why:

If a plausible form of panexperientialism is that which posits a universal, cosmic subject (as previously discussed here and here)then, by analogy with human experience, it is reasonable to assume that such a cosmic subject would in some sense retain previous experiences through memory. It is also reasonable to assume that the memories of the cosmic subject from the life cycle of one organism could potentially influence, be recalled by, or be passed on to other organisms.

Therefore, it seems to me that if panexperientialism is a plausible explanation of consciousness then it is also plausible that rebirth happens. Of course, this does not show that rebirth does occur, only that it plausibly could.

Implications

So, if one accepts that rebirth could be the case, why does this matter?

There are many implications, but here are just a couple:

Firstly, it means that claims of empirical evidence of rebirth are worthy of being taken seriously. For example, the work of Ian Stevenson may be worthy of close scrutiny. I have not assessed in much depth any of the purported evidence he has collected so am not in a position to comment on this.

Secondly, it means that a secular based buddhism (by which I suppose I mean one that is devoid of religious superstitions) need not necessarily disregard claims of rebirth. After all, if we respect the insights into consciousness of those such as the Buddha, then it is not very consistent to ignore or "bracket" important aspects of what they had to say.

In this respect it seems to me that insights into rebirth are a highly relevant aspect of many of those who have ventured into the deepest and most profound realms of consciousness. For example, the Pali Canon, the earliest written Buddhist scriptures, frequently records the Buddha recollecting past lives in deep state of meditation, such as here :

"When the mind was thus concentrated, purified, bright, unblemished, rid of defilement, pliant, malleable, steady, & attained to imperturbability, I directed it to the knowledge of recollecting my past lives."

Contemporary contemplatives, such as Ajahn Brahm also report recollection of past lives being an intrinsic part of deep meditation:

"When the memory of your own birth appears, it is just like you are there and you experience all feelings of that birth. Then you can ask yourself for an even earlier memory, and then you get back into your past lives."

So a sympathetic view of rebirth I think allows a more consistent and integrated reading of the teachings of those such as the Buddha.

As an aside however, regardless of the rationality of the concept of rebirth, from another angle I think there is some merit in the view that the illusory, transient and empty nature of the "I" means that the question of rebirth is by and large irrelevant. As Buddhadasa, another senior monk from the Thai Forest tradition, puts it:

"There is just a feeling of "I" and "mine" arising due to the foolishness whereby one is deluded by the beguiling nature of sense-experience. Therefore, there being no one born here, there is no one who dies and is reborn. So, the whole question of rebirth is utterly foolish and nothing to do with Buddhism at all."

To me, perhaps the most significant thing is that, whether or not one believes in rebirth, panexperientialism opens up the opportunity for a secular buddhism that is not only free of superstition but also frees the world of the sterility and lifelessnes of physicalism.

But to return to the primary topic of this post, I think it can be concluded that a belief in rebirth is not necessarily irrational or inconsistent with a logical, scientifically informed view of the world.

Friday, February 04, 2011

Panexperiential Holism and its implications

I came across this interesting little article by Ludwig Jaskolla and Alexander Buch regarding panexperiential holism. This is the thesis that:

“there is exactly one entity - the Universe itself. This entity can be
adequately described as being essentially
(i) an objective matter of fact,
(ii) objectively structured, i.e. not completely homogeneous,
(iii) a subject of experience and
(iv) exemplifying experiential content.”

I have previously discussed similar ideas in previous posts on this blog here, here and here. I think the authors make a good case for panexperiential holism as a cogent form of panexperientialism that circumvents the combination problem, on the obvious basis that if “human selves are to be understood as relatively stable experiential patterns within the big experiential subject”, then there is no combination problem.

One point of possible disagreement I have with Jaskolla and Buch is their view that physicalism is superior to panexperientialism in respect to parsimoniousness, whilst panexperientialism is superior in respect to coherence. My view is that although panexperientialism multiples the number of individual things which are experiential, as it does not posit a class of entities that are devoid of experience, it actually applies Occam’s razor more efficiently than physicalism and is more parsimonious.

The authors are part of a “group of philosophers, mathematicians and physicists working on ontology and metaphysics” from Munich with an interest in panexperientialism. This is the group's website. Looks like they have a very interesting conference coming up in June this year.

It is good to see that there are concentrated pockets of researchers seriously working on panexperientialism these days, which is where real advances and refinements are likely to be made in the field. I think the main barriers restraining panexperientialism from being widely accepted as a viable explanation of consciousness have been cultural and institutional, rather than logical. It seems these barriers are gradually being eroded.

Perhaps this erosion will be accompanied by an expansion in the intellectual regions which can safely be ventured into and explored using a panexperientialist framework. Which leads me on to the second theme of this post..

Implications

Given the above and other argumentation discussed on this blog I think that it can be said that panexperiential holism is at least as rational, coherent, plausible and logical as physicalism as an explanation of consciousness. In short, there is no rational reason not to accept that panexperiential holism may be the best explanation there is.

Given this, the issue that arises is what does this mean for other beliefs, contentions and phenomena which hitherto have been regarded by many, including myself, as irrational or kooky. I am referring to things such as telepathy, psychokinesis, quantum mysticism, all forms of new age ideas, religious themes, astral projection and so on. Under a physicalist outlook many of these beliefs can be dismissed outright, but if the Universe is a single, internally connected experiential being, the realms of the possible seem to expand enormously, and what may have looked prima face irrational no longer is. Much of what I am saying here could also be applied to other forms of pan experientialism, but the issue seems to me more acute in relation to panexperiential holism.

So, what to do if a rationally based metaphysics appears to lend support to putatively irrational and loopy ideas?

I think the answer here lies in a focus on science and empirical investigation. The arguments for panexperientialism are essentially philosophical arguments which are not significantly contingent on the findings of science. However, any empirical claim which is based on panexperientialist assumptions can be subject to the same investigative rigour as any other empirical claim.

Essentially this entails being open minded and skeptical at the same time. Where this differs from ‘standard science’, is in relation to the assumptions that are brought to bear in any empirical investigation. For instance, a claim of psychic phenomena may be dismissed by a skeptically minded person on the basis that there is a very remote chance of fraud having occurred. This may be accompanied by the assertion “such fraud may seem unlikely but it is more likely than the fundamental foundations of physical science are wrong”. If panexperiential holism is accepted as a real possibility, then the latter assumption has no validity and it may be more rational to assume the psychic event has occurred.

To give another example of the above approach, Richard Tarnas is a philosopher and cultural historian who wrote the best-selling Passion of the Western Mind , which outlines the history and intellectual development of the modern world view.

When I read that Tarnas’ latest book Cosmos and Psyche, deals with the subject of astrology and the “uncanny correspondence between the movement of the planets and the timing and character of historical events“ my immediate reaction was to dismiss it as the work of a new age crank. However, more investigation told me that this work deals with archetypal astrology, which does not imply that planetary events “cause” earthly events, but that they are both part of an underlying cosmic pattern. Such a position could be consistent with panexperientialist holism, in which the unity of consciousness of the Universe means many postulated forms of ‘cosmic connections’ could have rational coherence.

None of this is meant to say that I accept the conclusions of Tarnas’ book (which I have not read). However, as the conclusions of the book are consistent with a rational and reasonable model of consciousness, it is not rational or reasonable to dismiss the claims made out of hand . Rather, to make an assessment of his thesis would involve a thorough examination and assessment of the empirical claims made in the book regarding the linking of planetary and historical events.

To sum up, extraordinary claims do indeed require extraordinary evidence. However, if one accepts that panexperiential holism is a viable explanation of consciousness, then perhaps the threshold of what should be considered extraordinary is lowered.

Saturday, December 19, 2009

Strawson on Nietzsche's Metaphysics

Galen Strawson has delivered what looks like a very interesting paper on Nietzsche's Metaphysics at the recent Nietzsche on Mind and Nature conference. Here is an abstract of his presentation:

"Consider ten claims.
[1] There is no persisting and unitary self.
[2] There is no fundamental (real) distinction between objects on the one hand and their properties on the other.
[3] There is no fundamental (real) distinction between the base/categorical properties of things and the dispositional/power properties of things.
[4] There is no fundamental (real) distinction between objects or substances on the one hand and processes and events on the other.
[5] There is no fundamental (real) distinction between causes and effects.
[6] It is incorrect to say that objects are ‘governed’ by laws of nature.
[7] There is no free will.
[8] Determinism is true.
[9] Reality is one.
[10] The fundamental stuff of reality is suffused with—if it does not consist of—mentality in some form.

I’ll argue that Nietzsche’s mature position certainly includes [1]-[7], and also [8], properly understood, and probably or very probably [9] and [10]. I take it that [1] and [7] are clearly true, in the sense in which Nietzsche intends them, and I’ll argue that [2]-[6] are also true, and that [8]-[10] are also probably or very probably true. I take the claim that [1]-[10] are either certainly true or probably true to be powerful support for the view that Nietzsche held them."

There is a short review of Strawson's presentation on this blog.

Here are some previous posts of mine relating to panexperientialism and the work of Strawson or Nietzsche which might be of interest (most recent post listed first):

Nietzsche's naturalism - considers Brian Leiter's criticisms of a metaphysical interpretation of the Will to Power.

Property Dualism - micro, macro and mystery : discusses whether, if experience is taken to be a fundamental natural property, this fundamentality is best explained at the level of human consciousness or at the level of nature's most basic physical constituents.

The Will to Power, life and parsimony: considers whether Nietzsche unnecessarily invokes a ’vitalistic’ principle into biology which undermines his doctrine of the Will to Power and renders it unparsimonious.

Strawson reviews: reviews of Strawson's Consciousness and its Place in Nature.

Implausibility and Irrelevance - considers Nagasawa’s metaphysical argument against Strawson that panexperientialism is implausible or is irrelevant to the problem of consciousness.

Experience and the subject - discusses Strawson's views on experience, the subject of the experience and the content of the experience.

Bridging the gap: critique of an argument against Strawson that even in a best-case scenario―in which the phenomenal properties of the ultimates are known in complete detail―panpsychism still wouldn’t help us with the mind/body problem.

From fundamentality to ubiquity: Considers whether, if it is true that experience cannot emerge (in the sense described by Strawson) from the non-experiential, then it follows from this that some ultimates must be experiential.

Strawson on physicalism and panspychism - abstract of Strawson's argument for panpsychism.

Update Feb 2010:

Video and podcast of Strawson's talk is available here. Well worth a listen, though not much on proposition 10 (re panexperientialism) and I found it heavy going at times.

I quite liked the reference at 1:25 to "the most plausible, though difficult, view of the nature of reality ... the really hard nosed monist view, which is the Spinozian, Hegelian, Russellian, Eddingtonian and Whiteheadian view that reality is suffused with, even if it doesn't consist of, mentality in some form or sense".

Friday, November 20, 2009

Links and Web Resources

Please note that I don't intend to update or post on this blog on a regular basis any more (too much to do in 'meat-space' for me at the moment!).

If you come across any interesting links or news in relation to panexperientialism, please feel free to post a comment below.

INTRODUCTORY

Why I became a Panexperientialist by Charles Birch

Panpsychism by William Seager (encyclopedia article)

Panpsychism by David Skrbina (encyclopedia article)

PHILOSOPHICAL

Panpsychism by T.L.S. Sprigge (encyclopedia article)

Panexperientialist Physicalism and the Mind-Body problem by David Ray Griffin

Consciousness, Information and Panpsychism by William Seager

Panpsychism by William Seager (his most recent paper on the topic).

Why Physicalism entails Panpsychism by Galen Strawson

Recent Naturalistic Dualisms by William Lycan. Although no fan of panpsychism, Lycan argues that the most coherent form of property dualism implies panpsychism.

Online papers on Panpsychism compiled by David Chalmers.

Mind Dust - a group of philosophers, mathematicians and physicists working on ontology and metaphysics from Munich, Germany with an interest in panexperientialism.

WHITEHEADIAN PERSPECTIVES

Whitehead by John Cobb

Whitehead and the revival(?) of Panpsychism by William Seager

Whitehead's even more dangerous idea by Peter Fairleigh

Everything is Permuted
Website of Paul Cecil with numerous Whitehead/Hartshorne links

Center for Process Studies The Center is a faculty of Claremont School of Theology. Focus on Whitehead, Hartshorne and Process Theology. Extensive resources.

NONWHITEHEADIAN PERSPECTIVES

Participation, Organization, and Mind: Toward a Participatory Worldview by David Skrbina. Interesting panpsychist theory based on ideas from chaos theory and nonlinear dynamics. Also contains an excellent history of panpsychism.

A place for Consciousness
by Gregg Rosenberg. Explores the problems of causation and consciousness, leading to a panexperientialist solution.

Group Reading of Gregg Rosenberg's book (Physics Forums).

GENERAL SCIENCE

A Purpose For Everything by Charles Birch. On-line book examining purpose in nature.

Nature and Purpose by John F. Haught. Book with similar themes to that of Birch. Some chapters may not appeal to the secular minded.

Guide to Reality Science and philosophy blog with numerous panexperientialism related posts.

BIOLOGY/NEUROSCIENCE

Mind in Nature: the Interface of Science and Philosophy
Online book with various contributors. Edited by John B. Cobb Jr and David R. Griffin

Processing Towards Life by Charles Birch. Examines Self-organisation and subjectivity.

Embodied Human Consciousness, Abrupt Global Climate Change, and Freedom
Website of physiologist David Stoney which covers climate change issues as well as neurophysiology from a Whiteheadian panexperientialist perspective.

Psychological Physiology From the Standpoint of a Physiological Psychologist
by George Wolf

Whitehead'Psychological Physiology: A Third View by William Gallagher.
Relates how individual occasions of experience might give rise to the unified experience of human consciousness. Addresses (although in an indirect fashion) what Philosopher William Seager has described as the "Combination Problem".

Single-neuron Theory of Consciousness by Steven Sevush.
Proposes that the full content of conscious experience may be a property of individual neurons and that this would present a solution to the 'binding' problem.

Is Consciousness Only a Property of Individual Cells? by Jonathon CW Edwards.
Similar theme to previous paper, with more emphasis on the physics that might be involved.

See also website of Stuart Hameroff (under 'Physics').

CHEMISTRY

Self-Organization and Agency: In Chemistry and In Process Philosophy
by Joseph E. Earley

Towards a Process Philosophy of Chemistry by Ross Stein


PHYSICS

Online papers of Whitehead-influenced Quantum Physicist Henry Stapp

Quantum Consciousness Website of Stuart Hameroff, with focus on Hameroff-Pensrose microtubule/quantum model of consciousness.

Process Physics School of Chemistry, Physics and Earth Sciences, Flinders University. I have not tried to understand this stuff but apparently it has affinities with Whitehead's views, although arrived at independently.

MEDICINE/HEALTH

The Power of Thought to Heal:An Ontology of Personal Faithby Arthur Preston Smith. Psychosomatic healing from a panexperientialist perspective.

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