The Goldilocks Enigma

Paul Davies recent book "The Goldilocks Enigma" is a fascinating exploration of why the universe seems to be "just right" for life. Interest in the fine tuning issue (which is related to the anthropic principle) has received something of a revival in recent years, primarily because of the attention paid by some physicists to the view that our universe has an improbably appropriate amount of dark energy to allow galaxies to form and hence life to evolve. In this post, I aim to evaluate possible solutions to the fine tuning problem from a panexperientialist perspective.

It should be noted that some physicists argue that the universe is as not as fine tuned for life as others would suggest, most prominent among them being Victor Stenger (papers on the subject here). This is not an area where I am qualified to judge, but Davies' comment in his book that the odds of the amount of dark energy in the universe canceling out by chance to an amount that is appropriate for life being 10 to the power of 120 to one helped convinced me that the issue is one that demands consideration.

Some critics also eschew proposed solutions to the fine tuning issue on the basis that the proposed solutions cannot be tested and hence are not scientific. Whilst I think this criticism can have relevance in relation to unscientific claims which claim to be otherwise (for example, it seems to me that aspects of string theory may be more appropriately termed mathematicised philosophy rather than science), I don't believe falsifiable, scientific explanations are the only sort of explanations that are valuable or rational. Although generally a falsifiable model is preferable to one that is not, sometimes the most that can be hoped for is inference to the best explanation.

In assessing putative inferences to the best explanation, I think two key criteria to address are those of plausibility and parsimony - explanations should be credible and no more complicated than necessary. These criteria will be used as the basis for assessing the various possible solutions to the fine tuning problem in the remainder of this post. I will also be assuming in this post that the existence of an overarching universal subject (which I have previously discussed in posts here, here and here) is a plausible form of panexperientialism.

Another preliminary point to be made is that some critics of fine tuning arguments state that as we do not know that life occurs anywhere else in the universe other than Earth, the universe may not in fact be 'just right' for life. Davies makes the point that the fine tuning argument still applies in relation to the fact that the universe permits life in at least one place in the universe. For this to occur the universe must have laws which allow stable complex structures to form, must contain the sorts of substances that life requires and must provide a setting so that substances can come together in the appropriate way. Thus , the fine tuning argument still applies even if life only occurs on Earth. A related point here is that the fine tuning argument is separate from claims regarding the evolution of life- the universe being fine tuned for life to have formed initially is entirely compatible with the subsequent evolution of life occurring through random variation and natural selection.

In his book Davies discusses various proposed solutions to the fine tuning problem - coincidence, multiverses, intelligent design by God and variations of these - and finds all of them wanting. I won't reiterate his arguments here other than to say that I agree that these explanations do not seem to rate very well on the criteria of parsimony or plausibility.

I do think the multiverse concept may have some advantages over other options if it turns out to be indirectly testable and hence scientific. Davies says that this may be the case if the multiverse theory makes the prediction that galaxy formation should be frustrated by a value of dark energy such that the universe is marginally biofriendly rather than optimally biofriendly - which would seem too 'flukey'. But one wonders that if the result did come out as too flukey that multiverse proponents might then just fall back on the argument that we just happen to be living in a universe that is even more flukey than originally supposed.

Davies also elaborates on and expresses a preference for another intriguing possible solution to the fine tuning argument derived from the work of Johnathon Wheeler. Very briefly, Davies proposes that the universe may contain a 'life principle' that constrains the universe to evolve towards life and mind. This , of course, invokes a teleological aspect to cosmic evolution. Davies introduces this teleological element without abandoning naturalistic explanation by invoking quantum theory and backwards in time causation. By extending the delayed choice experiment from the scale of photons to the scale of the universe, Davies proposes that if the entire universe could evolve until it is permeated by mind and life, then it could engineer its own creation and evolution through backwards in time calibration of its initial conditions. This has the added bonus of forming a self-explanatory loop explaining the issue of why the universe exists at all!

I must admit that this solution initially struck me as kooky as panexperientialism no doubt seems to be to many physicalists. But, on reflection, I find it an ingenious attempt to naturalisitically explain fine tuning. The main problem I would have with it is in the likelihood that non-preexisting mind could evolve to saturate the whole universe (including, presumably, the interior of stars and the vastness of empty space), which I gather is a requirement for backward causation to work on a cosmic scale. In my view, it is more plausible that mind was their to start with. Hence, I'll now propose how a panexperientialist might explain the fine tuning problem.

In constructing a panexperientialist solution to the fine tuning problem, parsimony and plausibility constraints are paramount. It would not be hard to solve the problem by imputing a cosmic subject with all the powers of a super-intelligent and omnipotent God. However, the requirement of parsimony entails that the cosmic subject should be no more complicated than necessary.

To this end, I think that the starting point for the simplicity of the cosmic subject is that the inner workings of the subject are correlated with the observed physical world. Thus, as far as possible the internal subjectivity of the cosmic subject should manifest itself to an observer as the operation of physical laws, and postulating cosmic experiences which do not have observeable physical correlates should be avoided wherever possible.

Another related application of the simplicity criterion to the cosmic subject is that the subjective dynamics of the cosmos should be correlated with its outward evolution. On this point, what can be observed from the initial conditions of the big bang to the formation of galaxies, stars and planets which permit the evolution of life is a progressive differentiation. Thus, I think the cosmic subject can be parsimoniously attributed with a drive or urge towards self differentiation (incidentally, Freya Mathews explores the idea that the cosmos realises itself through self-differentiation from a psychological perspective in her book For Love of Matter).

Whilst positing a cosmic subject with an urge towards self differentiation may get some way toward solving the fine tuning problem, it is not enough. The parameters that allowed the universe to evolve into a biofriendly state were laid down in the early stages of the big bang or shortly thereafter, whereas the conditions of the universe that allowed life to evolve (for example the differentiation from a featureless primordial gas into galaxies and stars) occurred millions or billions of years after these initial conditions were determined. Thus, even allowing for a cosmic urge towards self differentiation , how would the universe 'know' to set the parameters such that differentiation would occur far off into the future?

I can envisage two possible solutions to this dilemma. The first is the universe must be imputed with a degree of foresight such that it was aware that the setting of the parameters at the initial stages of it's evolution would allow it to differentiate further in the future. In accordance with the simplicity criterion, this ability of foresight should not be made any more complex than need be. Hence, I do not think it would necessary to ascribe any intellectual, calculative or linguistic elements to it. Rather it could be likened to instinctual anticipation on a cosmic scale. An analogy could be perhaps made with a dog knowing how high to jump to catch a ball, without knowing any of the physics involved in assessing the trajectory of the ball and the muscular forces required for the jump; and the universe knowing how to differentiate itself in it's early phases such that it's potential for further differentiation would b enhanced. Of course, the time scales between a dog catching a ball and billions of years of cosmic evolution is great, but if a subject exists on a cosmic scale then it is reasonable to assume its experience of time would be vastly different from organisms on our scale.

The other solution to the dilemma is to embrace a modified backward causation model in which the universe evolves itself through backward causation. The difference (from the previously discussed backward causation model) being that the universe already possesses an experiential character at the time of its inception, with the direction of its evolution being engineered by a more explicitly intelligent and evolved subjectivity from the future.

In terms of weighing up these two alternatives to the foresight issue, I will just say a couple of things for now. The major disadvantage which I see in positing a cosmic subject which can anticipate the future is that there are no obvious physical correlates of this anticipation. The physical correlates of a dog anticipating catching a ball could be located in the firing of its neurons, but where would the equivalent physical correlate be for the anticipative propensities of the cosmic subject? It would appear that characteristics which permit this foresight are not physically observable (or at least have not been observed to date), which goes against the parsimony constraint previously discussed .

Another factor counting against the anticipative model is that it lacks the self explanatory loop explaining the existence of the universe, which is a purported feature of the backward causation model.

However, considering parsimony from another aspect, if one is already prepared to admit the existence of a cosmic subject at the beginning of the universe on other grounds, then it is not that much more to allow this subject to possess powers of foresight. Overall, I prefer the anticipative model to the backward causation model, but this is probably just an intuitive preference more than anything else.

By way of conclusion, I think it is reasonable to say that if one accepts a panexperientialist explanation of consciousness, then a plausible and parsimonious explanation for the universe being finely tuned for life may be that this is a consequence of the drive towards differentiation of an anticipative cosmic subject. The major challenge for this model lies in explaining how the cosmic subject anticipates the future and what the physical correlates of such anticipation might be.

Conversely, I also thinks that the fine tuning problem itself adds weight to versions of panexperientialism which posit the existence of a cosmic subject.

Forthcoming Book

I noticed on this blog that David Skrbina, author of the highly regarded "Panpsychism in the West", is editing a new book on panpsychism due out in 2008 or 2009.

The contributions in "Mind that Abides" aim to move "beyond a basic defense of panpsychism, and toward new positive theories as they relate to mind, consciousness, and reality."

Contibutors include Skrbina himself, Galen Strawson, Riccardo Manzotti, Stephen Deiss, Carey Carlson (Steve Esser reviews one of Carlson's books here), Stuart Hameroff and Freya Mathews (whose work was discussed in the post below).

One to look out for!

Thoughts on "The Ecological Self"

Further to my last post, I've recently read Freya Mathew's book "The Ecological Self" (also partially available on Google books). In this post I'll give a brief outline of the book and make some comments on it. There is not much by way of other reviews I could find to link to (which is not to say the book has been without influence- it is frequently referred to in environmental philosophy texts and the like).

The backcover of the book describes it as a treatment of the metaphysical foundations of ecological ethics. As such it is part an elaboration of a metaphysics and part an examination of the normative implications of this metaphysics. In this post I will be focusing on the metaphysical aspects of the book.

In constructing her model Mathews draws on theories and hypotheses from various disciplines including relativity physics and systems theory. Mathews says her project "was to find a metaphysical and ethical expression for the intuition of 'oneness' and interconnectedness, and Spinoza and Einstein provided a starting point." Mathews acknowledges that quantum mechanics could potentially also form a basis for a metaphysic of interconnectedness, but considers that the interpretation of QM is still in a state of uncertainty and flux such that it may not a stable base for such a project.

Chapter 1 provides a historical and analytical critique of "Newtonian Atomism" and it's ethical, environmental and ideological implications. This sort of critique of the atomistic portrayal of the world as "inert, insensate, devoid of telos, purpose and meaning" is of course fairly common, but the chapter was an enjoyable read nonetheless.

In Chapter 2, Mathews present her alternative cosmology to Newtonian atomism in the form of a monism based on Geometrodynamics. This model posits the existence of only one substance in the universe - spacetime. By way of some background on what Geomterodynamics ('GMD') is, here are some words Mathews quotes of it's founder, Johnathon Wheeler:

"Is spacetime only an arena within which fields and particles move about as 'physical' and 'foreign' entities. Or is the four-dimensional continuum all there is ? Is curved empty geometry a kind of magical building material out of which everything in the physical world is made: (1) slow curvature in one region of space describes a gravitational field; (2) a rippled geometry with a different type of curvature somewhere else describes an electromagnetic field; (3) a knotted-up region of high curvature describes a concentration of mass-energy that moves like a particle? Are fields and particles foreign entities immersed in geometry, or are they nothing but geometry​?"

The reduction of matter and every other physical phenomenon to the geometry of spacetime sounds like an intriguing and fascinating project. However, the problem with GMD from a scientific point of view is that it failed to adequately account for all the empirical data (eg it could not explain the existence of fermions) and so was largely abandoned by physicists, including Wheeler himself in the 1970s.

Despite the lack of scientific support for GMD, Mathews argues that a geometrodynamical cosmological model can be defended on metaphysical grounds alone. Thus, while there is no (current) scientific support for GMD, Mathews believes that as a metaphysic this view can be defended, based on two primary arguments:

(1) It provides a response to Hume's critique of causation. The basis of this critique was that there are no necessary connections between 'distinct existences' , where a distinct existence is a thing that can be conceived of existing independently of anything else (such as a cause and an effect, or the interactions between two objects). Mathews argues that by positing the existence of just one substance, changes within this substance (such as waves propagating through it) are intrinsically connected, so the problem of the lack of necessary connectedness does not arise. Mathews argues that this notion of causation can be applied both to classical determinism, which relates to local changes in the geometry of spacetime and quantum indeterminism which could be related to changes in the topological structure of spacetime (refer to page 75 to 76 for examples).

(2) The second argument is a dense metaphysical argument focusing on Spinoza's conception of substance (refer page 76 to 90), which I won't attempt to summarise in detail. The thrust of the argument is based on the characterisation of Spinoza's conception of substance as essentially relating to plenitude, where the formal properties of plenitude are unity, continuity, indivisibility and unboundedness. Mathews presents an argument for the principle of plenitude based on the view that if there is sufficient reason for the existence of one thing then there will be sufficient reason for the existence of every thing with which it can logically coexist. Thus, "a sufficient reason for the sheer fact of the actuality of substantivality then appears to entail a sufficient reason for unconstrained actual substantivality." Mathews uses the argument to conclude that the Principle of Plenitude "'implies that reality takes the from of dynamic spacetime, a spherical, finite but unbounded space that expands in time".

Whilst I found the metaphysical argument of Mathews for GMD, as much as I understood them, to be of considerable merit, I did not find it very satisfying that her model was partially derived from an unsupported scientific theory (especially as the incompleteness of the interpretation of QM was the reason given for not using it as a metaphysical basis - though it should be noted that this was in reference to the philosophical foundations of QM and not in relation to any particular empirical model). Whilst metaphysics can exist independently of science, I prefer a metaphysics that gels with physics, otherwise it is unlikely to be considered to be of contemporary relevance.

Despite this perceived flaw in Mathews model, I do not think it is fatal to it. The reason for this is that a substance monism based on spacetime does not have to confine itself to geometric properties. For example, Johnathon Schaffer in his paper Spacetime the One Substance types makes the distinction between moderate monism which is restricted to intrinsic properties as fundamental properties of spacetime, and strict monism which restricts itself to to intrinsic geometric properties only. Whilst strict monism appears to be without scientific support, Schaffer presents arguments from both General Relativity and Quantum Field Theory in favor of moderate monism.

Briefly, in relation to General Relativity Schaffer provides support for the view that GR models can be expressed as being in relation to fields which are properties or attributes of spacetime, with the physical world being fully describable in terms of attributes of the spacetime manifold. In relation to Quantum Field theory, he provides support for the view that the fundamental physical ingredients are fields rather than particles and that ‘particles’ are in fact excitation properties of spacetime.

Assuming Schaffer's arguments are sound, then the geometrodynamic model of Mathews can be modified to a moderate monist model, which is supported by current science. I believe this modification would not detract from the major features of her model (although maybe the second metaphysical argument may not have as much weight under moderate monism).

In addition to this, Schaffer puts forward another strong argument for spacetime monism - that of parsimony. If a single substance can in fact account for all ontological and empirical facts, then it seems unnecessary and extravagant to introduce another form of substance to account for material objects.

Having elaborated her monistic metaphysics of spacetime, in the next chapter Mathews outlines how a criterion for individuality within this substance might nevertheless be found, given that material objects no longer possess an absolute substantival identity. Mathews seeks this principle of individuation in systems theory and argues that an open system exhibiting self-regulation, homeostasis, equifinality (the reaching of a final state from different initial conditions) and goal-directedness can be described as self-realising. Self-realisability is then put forward as the principle of individuation. Mathews calls a self-realising system a 'self'.

The paradigmatic instance of the self-realising system is of course the organism (although Mathews leaves open the question of whether other systems such as ecosystems could also qualify as selves). So under this model, the only true individuals in the universe are spacetime itself and selves. I think the criteria for individuation here seem sound.

As an aside, I find it interesting and perhaps supportive of the significance of organisms as true individuals, that coming from the opposite ontological direction, Peter Van Inwagen in his book Material Beings argues that the only true material beings are fundamental particles and living organisms.

It is important to note here that "selves' are characterised by Mathews in systems theoretic terms and she does not rely on consciousness or experiential features of selfhood in this book (although this is a theme that she develops in her later book). As I read it, Mathews' metaphysical model in "The Ecological Self" could theoretically apply to a world in which consciousness was absent.

The next step in Mathews project is to investigate whether the concept of selfhood can be applied to the Cosmos itself. Here she also uses Spinoza's term of conatus as an equivalent to self-realizability, accept in so far as the former lacks systems-theoretic connotations. Using the previous argument regarding the essence of substance as being to seek plenitude (this being the reason that substance takes the form of an expanding space), she contends that this is a straightforward 'translation into the cosmic context of the principle of the conatus'. Thus Mathews concludes that the cosmos fulfills the self-realisability feature of a self-realising system. Mathews then considers whether the cosmos could meet the systems-theoretic model of a self-maintaining system and concludes that it does meet such requirements, though one of a special sort in that it is not an open system.

I found the arguments for the self hood of the cosmos, at first blush anyway, interesting but less than fully convincing. The expanding nature of the cosmos in itself does not seem to me to equate with the self-realisability which an organism posseses. But this is something I may need to dwell on some more.

The final chapter of the book traces the ethical implications of the model. Mathews cites three levels of value; that of the cosmos itself as a self-realising system; that of value which inheres in individual selves or self-realsing systems; and value which a self ascribes to elements in the environment (which is not an intrinsic value but represents the utility of the environment for a particular self).

These notions of value are then applied in the context of environmental ethics. Again, the notion of value used here does not imply consciousness, as "to be self-maintaining is just what it is to be valuable" and "it is not that an organism seeks to maintain itself because it values its existence, but rather that seeking to maintain itself is constitutive if its valuing itself."

Whilst I am not going to analyse Mathews ethical arguments here, to me the notion of intrinsic value is tied up with the subjectival or experiential aspect of an entity being "for itself", and so consideration of ethical value demands consideration of experientiality. Nevertheless, the chapter is an absorbing read, though the extent to which one buys the ethical arguments will depend on to what extent one has agreed with the metaphysics on which it is based.

In conclusion, I think the The Ecological Self covers some very interesting territory. Whilst I don't agree with all the arguments in the book, it has attracted me to the idea of a monistic cosmology. I have found in the past that perspectives which claim to be "holistic" often end up being either incoherent or a repackaged form of reductionism. But a scientifically based substance monism seems to open up the genuine possibility of a coherent holism.

Mathews later work in developing her model to incorporate subjectivity, and the recent work on monism by Johnathon Schaffer, have now sparked my interest and will probably be where I delve into next.

Links and Web Resources

INTRODUCTORY

Why I became a Panexperientialist by Charles Birch

Panpsychism by William Seager (encyclopedia article)

PHILOSOPHICAL

Panpsychism by T.L.S. Sprigge (encyclopedia article)

Panexperientialist Physicalism and the Mind-Body problem by David Ray Griffin

Consciousness, Information and Panpsychism by William Seager

Panpsychism by William Seager (his most recent paper on the topic).

Why Physicalism entails Panpsychism by Galen Strawson

Recent Naturalistic Dualisms by William Lycan. Although no fan of panpsychism, Lycan argues that the most coherent form of property dualism implies panpsychism.

Online papers on Panpsychism compiled by David Chalmers.

WHITEHEADIAN PERSPECTIVES

Whitehead by John Cobb

Whitehead and the revival(?) of Panpsychism by William Seager

Whitehead's even more dangerous idea by Peter Fairleigh

Everything is Permuted
Website of Paul Cecil with numerous Whitehead/Hartshorne links

Center for Process Studies The Center is a faculty of Claremont School of Theology. Focus on Whitehead, Hartshorne and Process Theology. Extensive resources.

NONWHITEHEADIAN PERSPECTIVES

Participation, Organization, and Mind: Toward a Participatory Worldview by David Skrbina. Interesting panpsychist theory based on ideas from chaos theory and nonlinear dynamics. Also contains an excellent history of panpsychism.

A place for Consciousness
by Gregg Rosenberg. Explores the problems of causation and consciousness, leading to a panexperientialist solution.

Group Reading of Gregg Rosenberg's book (Physics Forums).

GENERAL SCIENCE

A Purpose For Everything by Charles Birch. On-line book examining purpose in nature.

Nature and Purpose by John F. Haught. Book with similar themes to that of Birch. Some chapters may not appeal to the secular minded.

Guide to Reality Science and philosophy blog with numerous panexperientialism related posts.

BIOLOGY/NEUROSCIENCE

Mind in Nature: the Interface of Science and Philosophy
Online book with various contributors. Edited by John B. Cobb Jr and David R. Griffin

Processing Towards Life by Charles Birch. Examines Self-organisation and subjectivity.

Embodied Human Consciousness, Abrupt Global Climate Change, and Freedom
Website of physiologist David Stoney which covers climate change issues as well as neurophysiology from a Whiteheadian panexperientialist perspective.

Psychological Physiology From the Standpoint of a Physiological Psychologist
by George Wolf

Whitehead'Psychological Physiology: A Third View by William Gallagher.
Relates how individual occasions of experience might give rise to the unified experience of human consciousness. Addresses (although in an indirect fashion) what Philosopher William Seager has described as the "Combination Problem".

Single-neuron Theory of Consciousness by Steven Sevush.
Proposes that the full content of conscious experience may be a property of individual neurons and that this would present a solution to the 'binding' problem.

Is Consciousness Only a Property of Individual Cells? by Jonathon CW Edwards.
Similar theme to previous paper, with more emphasis on the physics that might be involved.

See also website of Stuart Hameroff (under 'Physics').

CHEMISTRY

Self-Organization and Agency: In Chemistry and In Process Philosophy
by Joseph E. Earley

Towards a Process Philosophy of Chemistry by Ross Stein


PHYSICS

Online papers of Whitehead-influenced Quantum Physicist Henry Stapp

Quantum Consciousness Website of Stuart Hameroff, with focus on Hameroff-Pensrose microtubule/quantum model of consciousness.

Process Physics School of Chemistry, Physics and Earth Sciences, Flinders University. I have not tried to understand this stuff but apparently it has affinities with Whitehead's views, although arrived at independently.

MEDICINE/HEALTH

The Power of Thought to Heal:An Ontology of Personal Faithby Arthur Preston Smith. Psychosomatic healing from a panexperientialist perspective.

Does Physicalism entail Cosmopsychism?

The increase in interest in panexperientialism (which I use synonymously with the term panpsychism) in recent years has focused mainly on a micropsychic form, in which microepxeriential events at the most fundamental level of nature are the basis from which human experience is constituted. However, another strand of panexperientialism imputes an overarching experience at the level of the universe as a whole.

For example, the model of Freya Mathews (briefly discussed in this blog previously here) posits the cosmos itself as a subject - "a vast field of felt impulse, of intrinsic activity, of internal expansions, swellings, dwindlings, contractions, surges, urges, and so forth." Within this "great internally differentiated field of felt impulsion" (which is described from an objective viewpoint by physical laws), certain local modes of self-realizing systems, such as human organisms, may themselves become centers of subjectivity or secondary subjects.

In this post, I aim to explore the concept of an overarching cosmic subject in the light of Galen's Strawson's influential paper "Realistic Monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism" (much discussed in previous posts on this blog).

For want of a better term, I'll call the view that there is a cosmic subject "cosmopsychism".

1. Strawson's argument

For the purposes of this post, I take the critical propositions in Strawson's argument to be the following:

1) physicalism is the view that every real, concrete phenomenon in the universe is physical . Concrete is equated with ‘spatio-temporally (or at least temporally) located’.
2) physicalism is true.
3) there is a plurality of ultimates ('using the term ‘ultimate’ to denote a fundamental physical entity, an ultimate constituent of reality, a particle,field, string, brane, simple, whatever').
4) everything physical (everything physical that there is or could be) is constituted out of ultimates of the sort we actually have in our universe.
(5) the universe is spatio-temporal in its fundamental nature.
(6) experience is a real concrete phenomenon.
(7) experiential phenomena cannot be emergent from wholly non-experiential phenomena.

Therefore,

(8)at least some ultimates are intrinsically experience-involving.

Proposition (8) follows from the premises that everything concrete is physical, that everything physical is constituted out of physical ultimates, and that experience is part of concrete reality.

Stawson derives panpsychism (all ultimates being experience involving) from micropsychism (some ultimates being experience-involving) on the basis of doubts that if this were not the case there would be a "radical heterogeneity at the very bottom of things".

He also takes "experience-involving" to indicate being a subject of experience, on the basis that every experience has a subject of that experience (this issue will be further discussed later).

2. Is Cosmopsychism consistent with Physicalism?

In order for cosmopsychism to be consistent with physicalism as characterized above, it is clear that at least one of the premises must be rejected. I think the most likely candidate for rejection is premise 4. This premise could be modified to:

(4) everything physical, with the possible exception of experience, is constituted out of ultimates.

The question which then arises is whether a position with this modified premise could still be called physicalism.

The modified premise could be the consistent with known physical laws. For instance, if one takes the epiphenomenalist view that experience has no effect on measurable physical activity, or the view that consciousness does not logically supervene on such activity, then it is clear that experience could be constituted from something other than ultimates without violating the laws of physics. Further, to say that experience is not constituted by ultimates is not to say that the arrangement of ultimates within a system such as the brain could not have a determining influence on the system's particular experiential features (ie the brain could be responsible for the character of human experience without being the cause of experience per se).

An analogy here could also be made with spacetime, which is not generally thought of as composed of ultimates (notwithstanding theories such as string theory which might may say otherwise) but is nevertheless part of the physical universe.

So I think with the modification of premise 4 the above set of propositions could still warrant the name physicalism. In view of this modification, the conclusion (8) now becomes:

(8)Either the universe itself, some ultimates, or something in between is intrinsically experience-involving.

With regard to what this "something in between" could be, the obvious candidate is the brain or part thereof. I considered this issue previously in the context of whether experience is a fundamental property characteristic of systems such as brains. In that post I concluded that given that other fundamental properties are widespread and associated with the most simple of systems, it seems implausible, arbitrary and unparsimonious to suppose that experience is fundamental yet also rare and wholly dependent on uniquely complex and specialized systems such as the brain. The same principles apply here to any other subsystem of the universe.

In relation to the universe itself being experiential, it might be objected here that even if experience is not constituted from ultimates it is nonsensical to speak of the universe as a single unified subject, as it is mostly empty space and it's distributed activities could not form a unified experiential whole.

I do not think this is a strong objection. In relation to human experience it is not known how the distributed activities of the central nervous system give rise to the unity of conscious perception ("the binding problem"). Nevertheless we know that conscious perception is real. Thus, just as we do not know how disparate activities of the brain give rise to the unity of conscious experience, so too we do not know how the disparate activities of the universe might be associated with a unity of experience. But the fact that human experience exists means that the analogous case of cosmic experience is not implausible.

It might be further be objected on this point that the brain is connected through the activity of neural networks whereas the universe is not. But the various elements of the universe, even across vast regions of empty space, are connected as well (through the the interactions of the fundamental forces, for instance). Certainly the type of connectivity is vastly different and presumably these differences would give rise to vast differences in experientiality, but the connectivity is there nevertheless.

The above reasoning leads to the conclusion that cosmopsychism is indeed consistent with physicalism, and that experience is most likely a property of either ultimates or the universe as a whole.

In the remainder of this post I will make some comments regarding the relative merits of these two positions.

3. Micropsychism Vs Cosmopsychism

Intuitional considerations

For those who regard the notion of sub atomic particles being experiential as crazy, the notion of a cosmic subject may appear even more bizarre. Whilst micropyschism has the issue of trillions of subjects at the level of ultimates pervading the universe , cosmopsychism has that of a single subject having trillions of simultaneous experiences (assuming that every event at the subatomic level is experienced separately by the cosmic subject, which may not necessarily be the case and would depend on the model developed ).

There does not appear to be any logical or conceptual impossibility to a single subject having trillions of experiences. For instance, I can be aware of a pain in my toe, a rumbling in my stomach, the screen in front of me and the shopping list on the fridge all at the same time and there is no reason in principle that this multiple experiencing could not be stretched indefinitely for a cosmic subject. This is analogous, in the case of micropsychism, to envisaging experiences becoming simpler and simpler right down to the level of fundamental particles. So I don't think that either position has an advantage here. It may be the case, as Strawson says in relation to micropsychist panpsychism, that it is just a matter of getting used to the idea.

The combination problem and the differentiation problem

One of the major problems with micropsychism is the "combination problem" of how one gets from discrete experiential events at the micro level to experience at the macro level such as human experience - that is, how the human subject is constituted from a myriad of subjects at the level of ultimates. For cosmopsychism, there is no combination problem. Rather there is a "differentiation problem"- that of how parts of the cosmic subject branch off and become unique subjects themselves.

Whilst both these problems are major issues for each view, cosmopsychism may have some explanatory advantage in relation to the evolution of human consciousness. For instance, Richard Dawkins speculates (in the "Selfish Gene") that "perhaps consciousness arises when the brain's simulation of the world becomes so complete that it must include a model of itself". While I don't think that such self-reflexivity does much to explain human consciousness under a standard physicalist view, under cosmopsychism it may have the potential to explain how a localised region of cosmic subjectivity could "loop back" on itself to create a secondary subject.

So perhaps the differentiation problem is less problematic than the combination problem in explaining human consciousness.

Subjectivity unity

Experiences belong to subjects and subjects are necessarily discrete, indivisible unities. That is, there are boundaries between subjects such that my experiences necessarily belong to me and not another.

The discrete nature of subjectivity accords well with some aspects of quantum physics, with each quantum event being perhaps associated with a discrete moment of subjectivity. However, I do not think that the unity and discreteness of subjectivity works so well with the wave aspect of wave-particle duality. Whilst this is a topic best left to those with more knowledge of physics than me, the continuous nature of electromagnetic waves, gravitational fields and so forth seem on the face of it difficult to reconcile with a micropsyhic view which requires experiences at the micro level to be associated with discrete subjects.

Under cosmopsychism, electromagnetic waves and the like could be experienced as part of a continuum or "stream of experience" and there is no need for each physical event to form a discrete package which can be assigned to a nonuniversal subject. The contrast between the unity of subjectivity and the continuous nature of the physical realm is a major point advanced by Freya Mathews in postulating a cosmopsychic form of panpsychism.

Another aspect of quantum physics which perhaps could be better accommodated within a cosmopsychic rather than micropsychic framework is quantum non-localism and entanglement. Quantum effects between spatially distant particles may be potentially explicable under a model in which the activities of these particles are experienced by a single cosmic subject.

4. Conclusion

Obviously there is a lot more that could be said on this matter, and all of the above falls far short of showing that physicalism necessarily entails cosmopsychism. Nevertheless, it may be the case that if one accepts that experience is real and physicalism is true, the most reasonable inference could turn out to be that a cosmic subject exists.

In any case, it definitely seems to me to be something worth further pondering on.