Thomas Nagel’s book Mind and Cosmos has been widely criticised for, amongst other things, suggesting that Neo-Darwinism is insufficient to explain the diversity of life forms and their attributes, including humans endowed with consciousness, reason and values. Nevertheless, I think the book contains some interesting speculations on consciousness, the implications of panpsychism for a naturalistic world view and the possibility of teleological principles influencing the course of events in the universe.
Following some of the paths which Nagel’s work opens up, the aim of this post is to offer some speculations on the implications of the form of panpsychism known as cosmopsychism for views about the evolution of life. Cosmospychism is the view that the universe is a conscious subject, from which human consciousness is derived or grounded. For the purposes of this post I will be assuming that cosmopsychism is plausible ( meaning that it is has a rational basis and is not wildly improbable).
Fine tuning and purpose
In this article, philosopher Philip Goff speculates that “agentive cosmopsychism” is a parsimonious explanation for the fine tuning of the universe for the possibility of life. Agentive cosmopsychism is the view that the universe act as an agent in mediating between cosmological facts and value facts. Goff argues that a conscious universe could have “chosen” the initial conditions and the laws of physics in order to make possible a universe of value in which life was possible. He argues that agentive cosmopsychism is an arguably more parsimonious explanation for fine tuning that other explanations such as multiverse theory or theistic explanation which invoke the intervention of a perfect and supernatural deity.
Goff speculates that the fine tuning could have occured in the first 10-43 seconds of the universe, known as the Planck Epoch, where current physical theories and laws of physics do not apply. In this period, the universe allegedly chose what the physical laws and constants would be such that the evolution of life would later be possible. Goff further argues that after the physical laws were laid down, the agentive capacity of the universe was very much constrained such that the “beneficence of the Universe does not much reveal itself these days”.
Taking the line of reasoning concerning the constraints of physical laws further, it could be argued that even if agentive cosmopsychism is true, the laws of physics entail that the agentive capacities of the universe ceased to have any effect at all once these laws came into being. Therefore, on this line of reasoning, there are no grounds for supposing that a cosmic subject could have played any role in the evolution of life.
However, I believe a reasonable argument can be made that if agentive cosmopsychism is the case, then the agentive capacities of the universe could indeed have been operative since the Planck Epoch.The implication of this is that it is a reasonable inference that an agentive universal subject may have not only have had an impact on the fine tuning of the universe for the appearance of of life, but also on the evolution of life itself.
A preliminary point to make concerns considerations of value. Goff makes the point that the “mental capacities of the Universe mediate between value facts and cosmological facts” and that the “the laws are fine-tuned because their being so leads to something of great value.” In an earlier post on this blog I suggested that a universal cosmic subject may have been responsible for fine tuning as a consequence of the drive towards differentiation of an anticipative cosmic subject. The view that the universe is striving to realise something of great value and the view that it has a drive towards differentiation into more complex forms are not necessarily irreconcilable. It could be said that the value which the universe is aiming for is differentiation. Nevertheless, in attributing value-realising attributes to the universe, such values should not be made more complex than they need to be. The postulated drive towards differentiation may not be anything sophisticated.
Laws of Nature
The advocate of the view that the agentive capacities of the universe ceased after the initial moments of the universe would argue that this is because, notwithstanding indeterminacy at the quantum scale, at the macroscopic level after the Planck epoch the universe was evolving in line with its initial conditions and the laws of physics. To argue that the agentive capacities of the universe need not have ceased after the first few moments entails arguing for the view that the laws of physics have not totally constrained the macroscopic behaviour of the universe. It entails that the agentive capacities of the universe have exerted some downward influence that is not explicable by the laws of physics and for the existence of some form of higher order ‘downward causation’.
Of course, to argue for downward causation and against reductive explanation based on physical laws does not, on the face of it, seem like a very parsimonious way to defend the idea that an agentive cosmopsychic subject could have influenced the history of the universe beyond its initial moments. However, if there are other grounds for inferring the possibility of downward causation, then this argument may not be unparsimonious.
A possible basis for affiring the existence of downward causation is provided by William James’ argument for the causal efficacy of consciousness. This arguments states that subjective mental states must have physical effects or otherwise they would not be generally appropriately aligned with adaptive effects. For example, the fact that things which are associated with positive feelings (such as eating, sleeping and sex) are beneficial to survival and visa versa suggests that feelings have behavioural effects. Otherwise there is no way that natural selection could have aligned the valence of feelings with reproductive fitness. And if subjective feelings have physical effects then such feelings must exert some top down influence upon human behaviour. My previous post has more on the evolutionary argument for the causal efficacy of consciousness.
From the above, if the evolutionary argument for the causal efficacy of consciousness is accepted, then it is evident that the behaviour of physical entities is not determined by nor explicable solely on the basis of microphysical facts and the laws of physics. Further, if top down causation can occur through human agency and there are other grounds for positing that there is a universal cosmic subject which has exerted influence on the physical behaviour of the universe in the past, then there seems no reason to deny that such influences could have been operative throughout the history of the universe.
Whitehead and Downward causation
To advocate for downward causation, whether at the level of the human or the cosmos, seems like such a radical proposition that some might say that any refutation of the evolutionary argument for the causal efficacy of consciousness, no matter how weak or feeble, should be embraced for the sake of maintaining the integrity of the foundations of physics and science generally. Perhaps this would be the appropriate position to adopt if there were no defensible interpretations of physics available which are consistent both with observed empirical facts and with the proposition that subjective states influence physical behaviour.
However, there are alternatives positions which are consistent with with the epirical findings of science and the possibility of downward causation. One such position is that of Alfred North Whitehead. Although Whitehead’s views were not strongly aligned with cosmopsychism, his position on the nature of laws can be readily adapted for a cosmopsychic framework.
In simple terms. Whitehead’s characterisation of physical laws is that they are akin to ‘habits’ of nature. Like any habit, such habits can occasionally not be followed. Such occurrences would be the times when downward causation exerts an influence.
Under a Whiteheadian model, the causal efficacy of consciousness can be explained by dominant subjective events influencing subsequent events in the body, resulting in changes in movement and behaviour of the organism. Whether such habit breaking has something to do with indeterminacy at the quantum level is an open question. On the other hand, things which are aggregations of subjective events with no dominant subjective occasions exerting ‘downward’ influence can adequately be explained by reductive explanation. To quote Whitehead:
“In these cases, “mutual influence is predominantly of a formal character expressible in formal sciences, such as mathematics. The inorganic is dominated by the average. It lacks individual expression in its parts. Their flashes of selection (if any) are sporadic and ineffective. Its parts merely transmit average expressions’.”
Or again:
"These massive laws, at present prevailing, are the general physical laws of inorganic nature. At a certain scale of observation they are prevalent without hint of interference. The formation of suns, the motions of planets, the geologic changes on the earth, seem to proceed with a massive impetus which excludes any hint of modification by other agencies. To this extent sense-perception on which science relies discloses no aim in nature."
On the assumption that a cosmic subject does exist, Whiteheads characterisation of the effects of subjective events on physical behaviour can be extended to the actions of this subject. Under such a characterisation, those occasions upon which the cosmic subject exerts “downward causation” are analogous to the exercise of volition in the human case. Downward influence in the exercise of volition occurs when the dominant subject of a human body acts with aim and purpose to overcome the domination of the body’s prevailing habits or physicochemical processes. Downward influence in cosmic events occurs when the universal subject acts with aim and purpose to overcome the domination of the universe’s prevailing habits or laws.
Absurdity and Incredibility
If the above argument is accepted, then a universal cosmic subject could potentially have some influence on the direction of evolution, presumably by exerting influences on the mutations on which natural selection acts, based on some sort of anticipative awareness of what the adaptive effects of such mutations might be.
Of course, all this talk of the universe influencing mutation events through its subjective purposes and aims seems incredible and probably absurd to the modern mind. But it is worth remembering that from the point of scientific explanation any form of influence of subjective purposes on physical behaviour, whether from the human mind or a cosmic subject, would be considered incredible.
Yet from the point of view of common sense it is also incredible to believe that humans do not act as a consequence of subjective aims. In everyday life it would be the height of absurdity to act as is one's subjective aims and purposes had no physical effects. In such a condition it is doubtful that one could move beyond a vegetative state let alone live a productive life. To quote Whitehead again:
“.. it is untrue to state that the general observation of mankind, in which sense-perception is only one factor, discloses no aim. The exact contrary is the case. All explanations of the sociological functionings of mankind include 'aim' as an essential factor in explanation. For example, in a criminal trial where the evidence is circumstantial the demonstration of motive is one chief reliance of the prosecution. In such a trial would the defence plead the doctrine that purpose could not direct the motions of the body, and that to indict the thief for stealing was analogous to indicting the sun for rising?”
It could be argued that science should take precedence over common sense in what is considered incredible or absurd. But the counter-argument to this is that the practice of science itself presupposes purposive behaviour - it relies on purposive agents whose aims and motivations influence theorising and experimentation - and that perhaps that the scientific framework needs to be adapted to accommodate this purposiveness.
I suppose the upshot of all this is that claims of absurdity or incredibility can be applied to views both for and against the influence of subjective aims and purposes on physical events and are not decisive either way.
Implications for Science
Thus far, it has only been argued that nonrandom directed mutation by a cosmic subject through the temporary breaking of the lawful habits of nature (physical laws) is a plausible mechanism for evolution, not that it is the preferred explanation. If more straightforward mechanisms of random mutation and natural selection (along with other factors such as genetic drift and gene flow) are sufficient to explain the evolution of life forms, there is no need to postulate the influence of a cosmic subject. As the majority consensus of scientists is that these factors are indeed sufficient, there thus does not seem to be much need to invoke the cosmopsychic explanation.
Nevertheless, to the extent that the existing explanations are alleged to fall short, or to the extent that further research in areas such as DNA barcoding raise issues about the improbability of random mutation being sufficient to explain the diversity of lifeforms, the cosmopsychist alternative is there as a plausible alternative explanation. The degree to which random mutation as a causative force of adaptation becomes improbable increases the potential relevance of cosmopsychism.
However, even if this were the case that the implausibility of random mutation were to increase the relevance of a cosmopsychic explanation, the issue remains of how does this relate to the practice of science. As science relies on explanation in terms of physical laws and we are talking about a break in nature’s habits, it is difficult to see how it could ever be directly proven that mutations involved a break in lawlike regularities. It may always be the case that the cosmopsychic alternative would only ever be an inference to the best explanation, based on the improbability of random mutation being a sufficient explanation.
Perhaps some indirect evidence could come from research into the neuroscience of volitional behaviour (notwithstanding the results of Libet’s experiments, of which this article details doubts about how these results have been interpreted). If future studies in the neuroscience of volition showed that the ability of the conscious mind to influence the behaviour of the body was the result of the physical properties of matter being different within the environment of the body, such that the laws of physics applying to inorganic matter do not always apply, this would give grounds to infer that subjectivity is able to alter the lawlike behaviour of matter. From there, the inference that the universe has purposively directed evolution would rest on the strength of the argument that the existence of human consciousness suggests that the universe itself is conscious.
Of course, there will always be a problem in incorporating subjective purposes into science based on objective observation. It could be argued that rather than invoking explanation based on unprovable subjective causation, any explanation which relies solely on objective factors, no matter how improbable, should be preferred. However, if there are grounds for concluding that subjective elements have objective effects (such as James’ evolutionary argument provides), the difficulty of incorporating this with scientific explanation is no reason to deny such a conclusion. If inferences derived from the observation of nature lead to the conclusion that subjective purposes influence physical events then the scope of what scientific explanation is may need adjustment, or the limitations of science recognised.
In this regard, some final further comments from Whitehead (from the same lecture as above) may be applicable as much to purposes of a postulated cosmic subject as they are to human subjects:
“Scientific reasoning is completely dominated by the presupposition that mental functionings are not properly part of nature. Accordingly it disregards all those mental antecedents which mankind habitually presuppose as effective in guiding cosmological functionings. As a method this procedure is entirely justifiable, provided that we recognize the limitations involved. These limitations are both obvious and undefined. The gradual eliciting of their definition is the hope of philosophy.”
Summary
The reasoning behind the above argument can be summarised as follows:
Following some of the paths which Nagel’s work opens up, the aim of this post is to offer some speculations on the implications of the form of panpsychism known as cosmopsychism for views about the evolution of life. Cosmospychism is the view that the universe is a conscious subject, from which human consciousness is derived or grounded. For the purposes of this post I will be assuming that cosmopsychism is plausible ( meaning that it is has a rational basis and is not wildly improbable).
Fine tuning and purpose
In this article, philosopher Philip Goff speculates that “agentive cosmopsychism” is a parsimonious explanation for the fine tuning of the universe for the possibility of life. Agentive cosmopsychism is the view that the universe act as an agent in mediating between cosmological facts and value facts. Goff argues that a conscious universe could have “chosen” the initial conditions and the laws of physics in order to make possible a universe of value in which life was possible. He argues that agentive cosmopsychism is an arguably more parsimonious explanation for fine tuning that other explanations such as multiverse theory or theistic explanation which invoke the intervention of a perfect and supernatural deity.
Goff speculates that the fine tuning could have occured in the first 10-43 seconds of the universe, known as the Planck Epoch, where current physical theories and laws of physics do not apply. In this period, the universe allegedly chose what the physical laws and constants would be such that the evolution of life would later be possible. Goff further argues that after the physical laws were laid down, the agentive capacity of the universe was very much constrained such that the “beneficence of the Universe does not much reveal itself these days”.
Taking the line of reasoning concerning the constraints of physical laws further, it could be argued that even if agentive cosmopsychism is true, the laws of physics entail that the agentive capacities of the universe ceased to have any effect at all once these laws came into being. Therefore, on this line of reasoning, there are no grounds for supposing that a cosmic subject could have played any role in the evolution of life.
However, I believe a reasonable argument can be made that if agentive cosmopsychism is the case, then the agentive capacities of the universe could indeed have been operative since the Planck Epoch.The implication of this is that it is a reasonable inference that an agentive universal subject may have not only have had an impact on the fine tuning of the universe for the appearance of of life, but also on the evolution of life itself.
A preliminary point to make concerns considerations of value. Goff makes the point that the “mental capacities of the Universe mediate between value facts and cosmological facts” and that the “the laws are fine-tuned because their being so leads to something of great value.” In an earlier post on this blog I suggested that a universal cosmic subject may have been responsible for fine tuning as a consequence of the drive towards differentiation of an anticipative cosmic subject. The view that the universe is striving to realise something of great value and the view that it has a drive towards differentiation into more complex forms are not necessarily irreconcilable. It could be said that the value which the universe is aiming for is differentiation. Nevertheless, in attributing value-realising attributes to the universe, such values should not be made more complex than they need to be. The postulated drive towards differentiation may not be anything sophisticated.
Laws of Nature
The advocate of the view that the agentive capacities of the universe ceased after the initial moments of the universe would argue that this is because, notwithstanding indeterminacy at the quantum scale, at the macroscopic level after the Planck epoch the universe was evolving in line with its initial conditions and the laws of physics. To argue that the agentive capacities of the universe need not have ceased after the first few moments entails arguing for the view that the laws of physics have not totally constrained the macroscopic behaviour of the universe. It entails that the agentive capacities of the universe have exerted some downward influence that is not explicable by the laws of physics and for the existence of some form of higher order ‘downward causation’.
Of course, to argue for downward causation and against reductive explanation based on physical laws does not, on the face of it, seem like a very parsimonious way to defend the idea that an agentive cosmopsychic subject could have influenced the history of the universe beyond its initial moments. However, if there are other grounds for inferring the possibility of downward causation, then this argument may not be unparsimonious.
A possible basis for affiring the existence of downward causation is provided by William James’ argument for the causal efficacy of consciousness. This arguments states that subjective mental states must have physical effects or otherwise they would not be generally appropriately aligned with adaptive effects. For example, the fact that things which are associated with positive feelings (such as eating, sleeping and sex) are beneficial to survival and visa versa suggests that feelings have behavioural effects. Otherwise there is no way that natural selection could have aligned the valence of feelings with reproductive fitness. And if subjective feelings have physical effects then such feelings must exert some top down influence upon human behaviour. My previous post has more on the evolutionary argument for the causal efficacy of consciousness.
From the above, if the evolutionary argument for the causal efficacy of consciousness is accepted, then it is evident that the behaviour of physical entities is not determined by nor explicable solely on the basis of microphysical facts and the laws of physics. Further, if top down causation can occur through human agency and there are other grounds for positing that there is a universal cosmic subject which has exerted influence on the physical behaviour of the universe in the past, then there seems no reason to deny that such influences could have been operative throughout the history of the universe.
Whitehead and Downward causation
To advocate for downward causation, whether at the level of the human or the cosmos, seems like such a radical proposition that some might say that any refutation of the evolutionary argument for the causal efficacy of consciousness, no matter how weak or feeble, should be embraced for the sake of maintaining the integrity of the foundations of physics and science generally. Perhaps this would be the appropriate position to adopt if there were no defensible interpretations of physics available which are consistent both with observed empirical facts and with the proposition that subjective states influence physical behaviour.
However, there are alternatives positions which are consistent with with the epirical findings of science and the possibility of downward causation. One such position is that of Alfred North Whitehead. Although Whitehead’s views were not strongly aligned with cosmopsychism, his position on the nature of laws can be readily adapted for a cosmopsychic framework.
In simple terms. Whitehead’s characterisation of physical laws is that they are akin to ‘habits’ of nature. Like any habit, such habits can occasionally not be followed. Such occurrences would be the times when downward causation exerts an influence.
Under a Whiteheadian model, the causal efficacy of consciousness can be explained by dominant subjective events influencing subsequent events in the body, resulting in changes in movement and behaviour of the organism. Whether such habit breaking has something to do with indeterminacy at the quantum level is an open question. On the other hand, things which are aggregations of subjective events with no dominant subjective occasions exerting ‘downward’ influence can adequately be explained by reductive explanation. To quote Whitehead:
“In these cases, “mutual influence is predominantly of a formal character expressible in formal sciences, such as mathematics. The inorganic is dominated by the average. It lacks individual expression in its parts. Their flashes of selection (if any) are sporadic and ineffective. Its parts merely transmit average expressions’.”
Or again:
"These massive laws, at present prevailing, are the general physical laws of inorganic nature. At a certain scale of observation they are prevalent without hint of interference. The formation of suns, the motions of planets, the geologic changes on the earth, seem to proceed with a massive impetus which excludes any hint of modification by other agencies. To this extent sense-perception on which science relies discloses no aim in nature."
On the assumption that a cosmic subject does exist, Whiteheads characterisation of the effects of subjective events on physical behaviour can be extended to the actions of this subject. Under such a characterisation, those occasions upon which the cosmic subject exerts “downward causation” are analogous to the exercise of volition in the human case. Downward influence in the exercise of volition occurs when the dominant subject of a human body acts with aim and purpose to overcome the domination of the body’s prevailing habits or physicochemical processes. Downward influence in cosmic events occurs when the universal subject acts with aim and purpose to overcome the domination of the universe’s prevailing habits or laws.
Absurdity and Incredibility
If the above argument is accepted, then a universal cosmic subject could potentially have some influence on the direction of evolution, presumably by exerting influences on the mutations on which natural selection acts, based on some sort of anticipative awareness of what the adaptive effects of such mutations might be.
Of course, all this talk of the universe influencing mutation events through its subjective purposes and aims seems incredible and probably absurd to the modern mind. But it is worth remembering that from the point of scientific explanation any form of influence of subjective purposes on physical behaviour, whether from the human mind or a cosmic subject, would be considered incredible.
Yet from the point of view of common sense it is also incredible to believe that humans do not act as a consequence of subjective aims. In everyday life it would be the height of absurdity to act as is one's subjective aims and purposes had no physical effects. In such a condition it is doubtful that one could move beyond a vegetative state let alone live a productive life. To quote Whitehead again:
“.. it is untrue to state that the general observation of mankind, in which sense-perception is only one factor, discloses no aim. The exact contrary is the case. All explanations of the sociological functionings of mankind include 'aim' as an essential factor in explanation. For example, in a criminal trial where the evidence is circumstantial the demonstration of motive is one chief reliance of the prosecution. In such a trial would the defence plead the doctrine that purpose could not direct the motions of the body, and that to indict the thief for stealing was analogous to indicting the sun for rising?”
It could be argued that science should take precedence over common sense in what is considered incredible or absurd. But the counter-argument to this is that the practice of science itself presupposes purposive behaviour - it relies on purposive agents whose aims and motivations influence theorising and experimentation - and that perhaps that the scientific framework needs to be adapted to accommodate this purposiveness.
I suppose the upshot of all this is that claims of absurdity or incredibility can be applied to views both for and against the influence of subjective aims and purposes on physical events and are not decisive either way.
Implications for Science
Thus far, it has only been argued that nonrandom directed mutation by a cosmic subject through the temporary breaking of the lawful habits of nature (physical laws) is a plausible mechanism for evolution, not that it is the preferred explanation. If more straightforward mechanisms of random mutation and natural selection (along with other factors such as genetic drift and gene flow) are sufficient to explain the evolution of life forms, there is no need to postulate the influence of a cosmic subject. As the majority consensus of scientists is that these factors are indeed sufficient, there thus does not seem to be much need to invoke the cosmopsychic explanation.
Nevertheless, to the extent that the existing explanations are alleged to fall short, or to the extent that further research in areas such as DNA barcoding raise issues about the improbability of random mutation being sufficient to explain the diversity of lifeforms, the cosmopsychist alternative is there as a plausible alternative explanation. The degree to which random mutation as a causative force of adaptation becomes improbable increases the potential relevance of cosmopsychism.
However, even if this were the case that the implausibility of random mutation were to increase the relevance of a cosmopsychic explanation, the issue remains of how does this relate to the practice of science. As science relies on explanation in terms of physical laws and we are talking about a break in nature’s habits, it is difficult to see how it could ever be directly proven that mutations involved a break in lawlike regularities. It may always be the case that the cosmopsychic alternative would only ever be an inference to the best explanation, based on the improbability of random mutation being a sufficient explanation.
Perhaps some indirect evidence could come from research into the neuroscience of volitional behaviour (notwithstanding the results of Libet’s experiments, of which this article details doubts about how these results have been interpreted). If future studies in the neuroscience of volition showed that the ability of the conscious mind to influence the behaviour of the body was the result of the physical properties of matter being different within the environment of the body, such that the laws of physics applying to inorganic matter do not always apply, this would give grounds to infer that subjectivity is able to alter the lawlike behaviour of matter. From there, the inference that the universe has purposively directed evolution would rest on the strength of the argument that the existence of human consciousness suggests that the universe itself is conscious.
Of course, there will always be a problem in incorporating subjective purposes into science based on objective observation. It could be argued that rather than invoking explanation based on unprovable subjective causation, any explanation which relies solely on objective factors, no matter how improbable, should be preferred. However, if there are grounds for concluding that subjective elements have objective effects (such as James’ evolutionary argument provides), the difficulty of incorporating this with scientific explanation is no reason to deny such a conclusion. If inferences derived from the observation of nature lead to the conclusion that subjective purposes influence physical events then the scope of what scientific explanation is may need adjustment, or the limitations of science recognised.
In this regard, some final further comments from Whitehead (from the same lecture as above) may be applicable as much to purposes of a postulated cosmic subject as they are to human subjects:
“Scientific reasoning is completely dominated by the presupposition that mental functionings are not properly part of nature. Accordingly it disregards all those mental antecedents which mankind habitually presuppose as effective in guiding cosmological functionings. As a method this procedure is entirely justifiable, provided that we recognize the limitations involved. These limitations are both obvious and undefined. The gradual eliciting of their definition is the hope of philosophy.”
Summary
The reasoning behind the above argument can be summarised as follows:
- Consciousness exists.
- Cosmospsychism is a reasonable explanation for human consciousness.
- Given 2, it is reasonable to infer that the fine tuning of the universe for the appearance of life is the result of purposive actions of a universal cosmic subject during the Planck Epoch.
- The appropriate alignment of subjective feelings with their survival value means it can reasonably be inferred that subjective feelings of humans influences physical behaviour.
- From 4 it follows that downward causation from subjective factors to physical behaviour occurs in nature and that some macroscopic physical events are not wholly determined by the laws of physics.
- Given 5 and 3, it is reasonable to infer that if a postulated cosmic subject has exerted physical influences in the past then it it still able to do this. That is, if human volition indicates the influence of downward causation, then there is no obvious reason to assume that a cosmic subject which has exerted downward casual influences in the past could not continue to do so.
- Given 6, it is reasonable to infer that a universal cosmic subject could have purposively influenced the evolution of living things.
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